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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses the gender bias presented by the disparate treatment of sex and
violence under current obscenity jurisprudence. Part II examines the legal evolution of obscenity
law and identifies the ways in which sex and violence are handled differently. Specifically, I
note that sexual works may readily be regulated as obscenity, while violent works unequivocally
may not. Part III explains that this disparate treatment is the result of entrenched gender bias
about the way men and women “should” react to sex and violence, and notes the hypocrisy of
failing to apply the same reasoning to assessments of violent versus sexual material. In this part,
I describe the prevailing notions of masculinity and femininity, as they have been identified by
sociological and legal scholars. I then explain the three principal ways in which obscenity can be
seen as a manifestation of gender bias, all of which rely on the identified sexual stereotypes.

II. THE STATE OF OBSCENITY
A. The “Inherent Morality” Standard
Material is currently pronounced obscene if it: (1) appeals to the prurient interest, as
determined by the average person applying community standards; (2) portrays sexual conduct in a
patently offensive way, as defined by applicable state law; and (3) lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.1 As it stands, then, the current constitutional test for obscenity looks
solely to whether the content of a particular work sufficiently comports with the prevailing moral
standards of the community in which it is sold. Notably, there is no reference made to whether a
potentially obscene work gives rise to immoral behavior or, indeed, whether it causes any legally

1

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
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cognizable harm at all. As one scholar writes:
[A]n obscenity prosecution does not require that anyone actually be offended by
the material itself. Many obscenity prosecutions, particularly at the federal level,
are initiated after elaborate investigations by law enforcement officers who
actively seek out material that, but for the investigation, would probably be seen
only by willing customers. Thus, although obscenity can be judged only with
reference to a community standard, obscenity is a quality that inheres in the
material itself. Material is obscene, and therefore subject to prosecution, solely
because it has the potential to offend.2
A work’s standalone moral character is dispositive of its legal status as obscenity. As such, this
standard may appropriately be called an “inherent morality” standard.3
In First Amendment jurisprudence, obscenity is the only category of unprotected speech
that is held to the “inherent morality” standard. That is, obscenity is the only speech excluded
from the First Amendment solely because of an inherent characteristic—offensiveness—where
all other categories of unprotected speech incorporate within their constitutional definitions some
kind of tangible social harm.4 While in practice, offending community standards may give rise
to social harms, those identified within the obscenity line of cases are characterized as
“secondary effects” of obscenity; social harms are not the primary concern that obscenity laws
are designed to handle.5 Instead, obscenity law addresses only the “moral harm”6 that may fall
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James Peterson, Behind the Curtain of Privacy: How Obscenity Law Inhibits the Expression of Ideas About Sex
and Gender, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 625, 635 (1998).
3
See Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Fighting the Pornification of America by Enforcing Obscenity Laws, 23 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 1, 4 (2012) (describing evolution of American obscenity law from English common law standard
focused on social effect of works to Constitutional standard concerned with content of works).
4
Compare Miller obscenity test with tests for other categories of unprotected speech: Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969) (Incitement causes imminent unlawful acts); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 586 (1942)
(Fighting words cause imminent violence/illegal acts); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (Defamation
causes personal injury); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
(Fraudulent or deceptive commercial speech speech itself violates laws); Masses Publ'g v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (1917)
(Speech “integral to criminal conduct” enabled commission of conspiracy to commit espionage).
5
See, e.g., Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 42 U.S. 50 (1976) (discussing secondary effects of pornography).
6
Bret Boyce, Obscenity and Community Standards, 33 YALE J. INT'L. L. 299, 324 (2008) (“Thus, although the Court
does allude to the (empirically unproven) possibility that obscenity might incite physical harm, the primary state
interest that the Court invokes is the possibility of moral harm: damage to the ‘quality of life’; injury to ‘the
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upon the consumer of obscene material as a result of its lackluster “inherent morality.”
Obscenity is also anomalous in First Amendment jurisprudence because it may be
regulated in contravention of the fundamental constitutional principle that speech may not be
suppressed merely because it is unpopular or offensive to the community. The Supreme Court
has expressly held that “the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason
for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a
reason for according it constitutional protection.”7 Yet offensiveness is the exact reason given
for the suppression of obscenity: “Obscene materials have been denied the protection of the First
Amendment because their content is so offensive to contemporary moral standards.”8 Thus,
while offensiveness is typically a reason for according constitutional protection, for obscenity it
is the constitutional basis for suppression.
Finally, obscenity is an anomaly because it seeks to suppress a particular topic of speech.
All other unprotected categories are left unprotected because of the effect that they have on the
recipient(s), with no reference made to the matter being discussed.9 For example, “fighting
words” are outside First Amendment protection because “by their very utterance, [they] inflict
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”10 This constitutional definition is not
concerned with the topic at hand; fighting words are fighting words whether they concern
religion, politics, or what the listener had for breakfast. It is the fact that the listener would be
“invited to fisticuffs” that renders fighting words unprotected. In contrast, obscenity laws may

development of the human personality,’ ‘family life,’ and ‘the community as a whole’; and the corruption of ‘a
decent society.’”).
7
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978).
8
Id.
9
See supra, text accompanying note 2.
10
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
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only suppress speech about sex.11 A closer look at the evolution of constitutional obscenity
jurisprudence illuminates why sex receives this “special” treatment.12
B. Sex and Violence Under the “Inherent Morality” Standard
The inherent morality standard singles out sexual speech as the only topic deserving of
the obscenity moniker.13 Because the definition of obscenity requires the presence of sexual
elements, works with sexual elements are necessarily susceptible to overregulation and outright
ban under color of obscenity law. Works with sexual elements are thus categorically afforded
less protection than other works, and the Supreme Court has even intimated that non-obscene
sexual works may permissibly be given lesser protection than non-sexual works.14
In contrast, it has been exceedingly difficult for states to regulate violent works (or works
which may offend community mores on other grounds, such as those that are sacrilegious or
disgusting), even where such works have been empirically shown to increase violent thoughts
and acts in consumers.15 Laws regulating violent speech are presumptively invalid,16 even where
they track the same language as valid laws regulating sexual speech and were adopted under the
same rationale.17 As discussed in Part III below, this disparate treatment is the result of
entrenched gender bias.
See Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) (“Our cases have been clear that the obscenity
exception to the First Amendment does not cover whatever a legislature finds shocking, but only depictions of
‘sexual conduct.’”).
12
See Part II.B, infra.
13
See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734 (“Our cases have been clear that the obscenity exception to the First Amendment
does not cover whatever a legislature finds shocking, but only depictions of ‘sexual conduct.’”)
14
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 862–67 (2007) (discussing the multitude
of separate obscenity tests developed by individual justices from 1957 through 1973, which on the whole tended to
agree that sexually explicit, non-obscene material “should occupy a subordinate position as ‘lower value’ speech.”).
15
See, e.g., U.S. v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
16
Presumptively invalid laws are evaluated under strict scrutiny inquiry, and will be struck down unless passed to
further a compelling government interest and narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.
17
See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1579-81 (describing 18 U.S.C. 48, the Congressional Act against animal cruelty, as
being based on Miller’s obscenity standard, and adopted under the same rationale as was accepted to proscribe child
pornography).
11
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1. Regulation of Sexual Expression
To justify regulating solely speech about sex, the inherent morality standard relies on an
“historical consensus” rationale. The first obscenity law was passed in 1711 in the
Massachusetts Bay colony, which made it an offense to write, print or publish “any Filthy
Obscene or Prophane Song, Pamphlet, Libel or Mock-Sermon, in Imitation or in Mimicking of
Preaching, or any other part of Divine Worship.”18 However, that law dealt principally with
profanity, not sexual material. The first reported obscenity case was decided over a century later,
in 1815.19 In 1821, the first obscenity legislation dealing with sexual material was passed.20
However, the current definition of obscenity is originally derived from a famous 1868 English
case, Regina v. Hicklin.21 Under Hicklin, material that tended to “deprave and corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences” was deemed obscene and could be banned.22
The United States Supreme Court, however, disapproved of Hicklin’s Victorian prudery; i.e., that
its reference point was “the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons”
rather than the general consuming public.23 The Hicklin standard was thus broadened upon the
Court’s first annunciation of a constitutional obscenity standard in 1957. In Roth v. United
States, the Court held that material was deemed obscene by determining “whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to prurient interest.”24 The Roth Court reasoned that “[i]mplicit in the history
of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social

18

Acts and Laws of Massachusetts Bay 219, 222 (1714).
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Sharpless, 1815 WL 1297 (Dec. 1, 1815).
20
Conn. Stat. Laws 165 (1821).
21
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1957).
22
R. v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 (Q.B.) 360, 371 (1868).
23
Roth, 354 U.S. at 489.
24
Id.
19
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importance.”25 In other words, the Roth Court deemed material appealing to the prurient interest
“no-value” speech, and averred such speech has always been excluded from First Amendment
protection. As the standard thus shifted from the common law to constitutional law, the test for
judging obscenity shifted from its social effect to its contents.26
However, the Roth obscenity standard, with its ambiguous references to “contemporary
community standards” and “appeals to the prurient interest” proved nearly impossible for the
courts to interpret with any regularity.27 Indeed, as one scholar observed, “[b]etween 1957 and
1973, the Court issued thirteen decisions on the issue of obscenity. Those thirteen decisions
produced fifty-five separate opinions.”28 Regardless, after sixteen years “during which [the]
Court struggled with the intractable obscenity problem,”29 despite “considerable vacillation over
the proper definition of obscenity,”30 and notwithstanding Justice Stewart’s oft-quoted aphorism
(“I know it when I see it”),31 the Court put an end to such haphazard results by essentially
adopting the Roth test wholesale in the paradigm obscenity case of Miller v. California.32
Under the Miller test, material is obscene if it: (1) appeals to the prurient interest, as
determined by the average person applying community standards; (2) portrays sexual conduct in
a patently offensive way, as defined by applicable state law; and (3) lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.33 The 1973 Miller test remains, essentially unchanged, the

25

Id.
Hatch, supra note 3, at 4.
27
See Boyce, supra note 6 (discussing evolution of obscenity law).
28
Peterson, supra note 2, at 629.
29
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 754 (1982) (quoting Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676,
704 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
30
Id.
31
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (referring to the category of “hard-core”
pornography).
32
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
33
Id.
26
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operative constitutional standard for determining obscenity today.34
Two later obscenity cases merit brief discussion: the 1968 case of Ginsberg v. New
York,35 in which the Court held that non-obscene sexual material could be considered obscenity
as applied to minors, and the 1982 case of New York v. Ferber,36 in which the Court established
that child pornography is outside the First Amendment. Ginsberg involved a New York statute
criminalizing the “knowing sale to a minor (a) of any picture which depicts nudity and which is
harmful to minors or (b) any magazine which contains such pictures and which, taken as a
whole, is harmful to minors.”37 “Harmful to minors” was then defined by applying the three
Miller factors as “to minors.”38 The Court upheld the petitioner’s conviction for selling “girlie
magazines”39 to a sixteen year old, holding that
[m]aterial which is protected for distribution to adults is not necessarily
constitutionally protected from restriction upon its dissemination to children. In
other words, the concept of obscenity or of unprotected matter may vary
according to the group to whom the questionable material is directed or from
whom it is quarantined.40
The Court presented two rationales for its holding, stating that the Constitution has long been
interpreted to recognize parents’ interest in directing the upbringing of their children, and that the
state has a justifiable interest in the well-being of its minors.41 Generally, then, the Ginsberg
Court merely reaffirmed its reasoning that speech about sex may be outside the First Amendment

34

See, e.g., U.S. v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
390 U.S. 629 (1968).
36
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 751 (1982).
37
Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631–32 (quotation marks omitted).
38
Id. (“‘Harmful to minors’ means that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity,
sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse, when it: (i) predominantly appeals to the prurient,
shameful or morbid interest of minors, and (ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community
as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and (iii) is utterly without redeeming social
importance for minors.”).
39
Id.
40
Id. at 636 (quoting Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 218 N.E.2d 668, 671 (N.Y. 1966)).
41
See id.
35
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when it lacks “social value” and is offensive to the community. The novelty was that the
Ginsberg holding established that the constitutional definition of any “unprotected matter may
vary” according to the intended audience.
The Court has characterized its holding in Ginsberg as merely “sustain[ing] state power
to exclude material [already] defined as obscenity”42 and “simply adjust[ing] the definition of
obscenity to social realities,”43 rather than establishing a new category of unprotected speech. Of
course, whether historically non-obscene material could be “defined as obscenity” was the
precise issue determined by the Court in Ginsberg; the Court’s characterization was thus
dispositive. That is, by stating that the magazines at issue were within a sub-category of
obscenity (obscenity as to minors), the law at issue was presumed a valid content-based
restriction on material wholly outside of the First Amendment and was thus upheld under a
rational basis test.44 If the Ginsberg Court had considered themselves creating a new category of
unprotected speech (obscenity as to minors), it would have had to apply the strict scrutiny test
required in all cases involving content-based restrictions on protected speech.
In New York v. Ferber,45 the Court identified—allegedly for the last time46—a new
category of speech wholly outside the First Amendment: child pornography. New York had
passed a law making it a felony “to procure, manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail,
deliver, transfer, transmute, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit or
advertise . . . a sexual performance by a child . . . which includes sexual conduct by a child less

42

Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641 (emphasis added).
Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 959 (9th Cir. 2009).
44
Id.
45
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
46
See Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) (No new categories of speech may be excluded
from the First Amendment “without persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a long (if
heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription[.]”).
43

9

than sixteen years of age.”47 The Supreme Court upheld the statute, generically concluding that
“[w]hen a definable class of material . . . bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of
children engaged in its production, we think the balance of competing interests is clearly struck
and that it is permissible to consider these materials as without the protection of the First
Amendment.”48 The Court reasoned that the state’s interest in preventing sexual abuse of the
children forced to make pornographic videos, together with the patently criminal nature of the
underlying conduct and the inability of law enforcement to combat the underlying crime without
targeting commercial distribution of the videos, “overwhelmingly outweighed” the de minimus,
if any, social value child pornography offered.49 The Court further concluded that it was “not
rare”50 in Supreme Court jurisprudence to allow a content-based classification when “the evil to
be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no
process of case-by-case adjudication is required.”51 Finally, the Court took care to distinguish
child pornography from obscenity:
The test for child pornography is separate from the obscenity standard enunciated
in Miller, but may be compared to it for the purpose of clarity. The Miller
formulation is adjusted in the following respects: A trier of fact need not find that
the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it is not
required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive manner;
and the material at issue need not be considered as a whole. We note that the
distribution of descriptions or other depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise
obscene, which do not involve live performance or photographic or other visual
reproduction of live performances, retains First Amendment protection.52
In distinguishing unprotected child pornography from “other depictions of [non-obscene] sexual

47

Ferber, 458 U.S. at 751.
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 763; see also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942), and Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
51
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763 (citing Young v. Am. Mini-Theaters, 427 U.S. 50 (1976)).
52
Id. at 764–65.
48
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conduct . . . which do not involve live performances,” the Court made clear that it was choosing
to categorically exclude live performance-based child pornography because the ancillary and
corollary harms to children outweighed the value of its expression. Thus, Ferber instructs that
while obscenity is solely concerned with addressing moral harm, other sexual expression may be
permissibly excluded from the First Amendment on the grounds that the resulting social harms
outweigh its social value.
2. Why Offensiveness vis-à-vis Sex Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague
Notably, the standard for obscenity was criticized from the outset. In Roth, a dissenting
Justice Douglas attacked the standard for singling out sex as the only topic of discussion
punishable for merely being discussed, its reliance on majority rule, and its condemnation of
thoughts without acts.53 Justice Douglas disapproved that the standard made “the legality of a
publication turn on the purity of thought which a book or a tract instills in the mind of the
reader,” and imposed punishment “for thoughts provoked, not for overt acts nor antisocial
conduct.”54 He found the reliance on community standards inapposite to established First
Amendment jurisprudence, observing that such a standard “would not be an acceptable one if
religion, economics, politics or philosophy were involved.”55 Why should it be acceptable where
the topic is sex? The answer must be inferred from context, as the Court provided none.56
Apparently, it was accepted fact in 1957 that there existed a general consensus on what
was “normal” sexual conduct and what was “offensive” sexual conduct. In Roth, the Court
dismissed concerns that the new obscenity standard was unconstitutionally vague, holding that
53

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 509-10 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id.
55
Id. at 512.
56
See Boyce, supra note 6 (“What is most striking about U.S. obscenity jurisprudence is that the Court has made
little effort to supply a rationale for the community standards test.”).
54
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“the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured
by common understanding and practices. These words . . . give adequate warning of the conduct
proscribed and mark boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries fairly to administer the
law.”57 The Court likewise quoted Roth’s “common understanding and practices” language in
concluding that the test enunciated in Miller “provide[d] fair notice” of what was illegal.58 And
the Court again relied on that language in Hamling v. United States,59 when it concluded that a
pre-Miller obscenity law was not unconstitutionally vague.60 Thus, the current law of obscenity
depends for its meaning, and ultimately its constitutionality, on the existence of a “common
understanding” regarding what depictions of sexual conduct meet the elements of the obscenity
standard. As discussed in Part Two, infra, the “common understanding” necessary to
interpreting Miller incorporates long-standing biases about gender roles and proper sexual
expression.
Despite running contrary to First Amendment principles, reliance on an assumed
“common understanding” of what is offensive sexual conduct is permitted to stand as a test for
constitutionality for one reason: tradition. The Supreme Court finally articulated a reason for
treating sex differently than other potentially offensive subjects in 2011, holding that speech
about sexual conduct may be suppressed because we have traditionally suppressed it.61 Even
more shocking—particularly in light of Miller’s reference to “contemporary community
standards”—the Court has unequivocally stated that no new topics may be added to the
definition of obscenity nor may new categories of speech may be excluded from the First
57

Roth, 354 U.S. at 491 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 & n.10.
59
418 U.S. 87 (1974).
60
Id. at 110–11.
61
U.S. v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (“[T]he First Amendment has permitted restrictions upon the
content of speech in a few limited areas, and has never included a freedom to disregard these traditional
limitations.”)
58
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Amendment, unless such speech has a well-established history of being suppressed.62 As a
result, states are compelled to advance outdated, historic notions of morality solely because they
are historic, and are further disallowed from adopting new standards that reflect contemporary
notions of morality, despite that the constitutional law as articulated in Miller requires as much.
3. Regulation of Violent Expression
In general, the Supreme Court has refused to extend its concept of obscenity to include
violent works, and has further refused to find violent expression outside the First Amendment on
any grounds.63 Two recent decisions in particular highlight the hypocrisy of holding speech
about sex and violence to different standards, despite that the justifications for excluding sexual
speech from the First Amendment are directly applicable to violent speech, and that violent
speech often comports with the inherent morality standard.
In the handful of Supreme Court cases addressing the propriety of state regulation of
violent speech, one trends stands out: the Court consistently strikes down violent speech
regulations on the grounds of overbreadth or vagueness.64 In so ruling, the Court reasons that no
community could possibly come to a consensus on when violent speech is too offensive, and
therefore that laws regulating violent speech which track the Miller obscenity language could
never “give men adequate notice of the conduct proscribed.”65 The Court adopts this nonconsensus view about violent speech even where the state legislation at issue was passed by

See Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) (No new categories of speech may be excluded
from the First Amendment “without persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a long (if
heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription[.]”).
63
Id. (rejecting attempts to analogize violent speech to obscenity, child pornography, speech integral to criminal
conduct, and attempts to carve out a new category of unprotected speech).
64
See, e.g., Winters, Stevens, Entm’t Merch.
65
See, e.g., U.S. v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
62
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popular vote,66 while unabashedly holding that “common understanding and practices” about sex
protect the Miller standard from unconstitutional vagueness.67
In the first case, United States v. Stevens, the respondent made a facial challenge to a
Congressional Act regulating animal crush videos (“Section 48”). Section 48 criminalized the
commercial creation, sale, or possession of any depiction of “animal cruelty,” defined where a
living animal was “intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed.”68 In a nod to
Miller’s standard, Section 48 covered only those depictions of conduct that were illegal pursuant
to federal or state statute (a reference to Miller’s reliance on “community standards” and
“applicable state law” to define the contours of offensiveness), but exempted from coverage any
depiction with “serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or
artistic value.”69 These facts provided an excellent stepping stone for the Court to hold violent
material within the obscenity definition, because crush videos—which “depict women slowly
crushing animals to death with their bare feet or while wearing high heeled shoes, sometimes
while talking to the animals in a kind of dominatrix patter over the cries and squeals of the
animals, obviously in great pain.”70—“appeal to persons with a very specific sexual fetish who
find them sexually arousing or otherwise exciting.”71 That is, the videos, while violent, also
appealed to the prurient interest in sex. However, the Court did not even mention prurience in
Stevens and ultimately struck down Section 48 for overbreadth.72
First, the Court stated that Section 48 was presumptively invalid because it regulated

See, e.g., Entm’t Merch., 131 S. Ct. at 2729 (holding that there can be no consensus on what violence is offensive
even where the statute at issue, Cal. Civ.Code Ann. §§ 1746–1746.5 (West 2009), was passed by popular vote).
67
See Hamling v. U.S., 418 U.S. 87, 110–11 (1974).
68
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1583.
69
Id.
70
Id. (citing H.R.Rep. No. 106–397, p. 2 (1999)).
71
Id.
72
Id.
66
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expression based on its violent content, and violent expression is not a traditional category of
unprotected speech.73 The Government argued that violent expression should be categorically
excluded from the First Amendment, based on the Court’s well-established “no-value speech”
rationale.74 The Court responded that lack of social value has never been “the basis” for
categorical exclusion, and thus cannot be grounds for carving out a new category of unprotected
speech.75 It stated that any prior discussion of the low social value of unprotected speech was
merely a description of that speech, not justification for removing its protection.76
Here, the Stevens Court is just wrong. While accurately stating that descriptions of the
excluded categories as low-value “do not set forth a test that may be applied as a general
matter”77 and that categorical exclusion “has not been on the basis of a simple cost-benefit
analysis,”78 the Stevens Court conflated “basis” and “test” for its own ends. Yes, a cost-benefit
test has never been the constitutional standard for excluding an entire category of speech from
the First Amendment. But it does not follow that a social cost-benefit analysis has not been at
the heart of the justification for every categorical exclusion.
In arguing that low social value has never been the basis for exclusion, the Stevens Court
regurgitated oft-quoted79 language from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire80 but mischaracterized its
context as description rather than justification. The Chaplinsky Court described unprotected

73

Stevens, 130 U.S. at 1585.
Id. (The Government contended that “depictions of illegal acts of animal cruelty that are made, sold, or possessed
[solely] for commercial gain necessarily lack expressive value, and may accordingly be regulated as unprotected
speech.”).
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585.
79
See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450 (1969); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Virginia Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), U.S. v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
80
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
74

15

speech as “those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace,” but then reasoned that they are categorically excluded because “such utterances
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest
in order and morality.”81 Similarly, the Roth Court unequivocally stated that obscenity is
permissibly removed from First Amendment protection because it is “no-value” speech.82 The
reasoning behind excluding incitement, defamation, commercial fraud, and speech integral to
criminal conduct is self-evident: the First Amendment does not protect speech with such low
social value that it is by definition a crime or the proximate cause of a crime. Finally, the Court
has described its First Amendment jurisprudence as frequently being based on a social costbenefit analysis, when stating in Ferber that it was “not rare”83 for the Court to allow a contentbased classification when “the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive
interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required.”84 It appears
that the Stevens Court took great pains to characterize its precedential justifications as
descriptions in order to avoid the conclusion that speech with no social value has historically
been excluded from the First Amendment on that “basis” (though perhaps not by that “test”).
After refusing to find a new category of unprotected speech for lack of historical
precedent, the Stevens Court next dismissed the Government’s attempts to analogize regulation
of crush videos to existing unprotected categories. The obvious analog is obscenity; Section 48
criminalized (1) commercial depictions of “animal cruelty,” as defined therein; (2) where those
81
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depictions are illegal pursuant to federal or state statute; and (3) where the depictions lack
“serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value.”85
Replacing sexual conduct with animal cruelty, then, Section 48 mirrors Miller with few changes.
The first Miller prong is satisfied by Section 48 in the case of crush videos, though the Court did
not so much as mention their prurient nature.86 By requiring the underlying conduct be illegal
under state or federal law, Section 48 follows Miller’s second prong. That is, it is axiomatic that
only those acts which are offensive to social mores beyond question are made illegal.87 Finally,
Section 48’s exceptions clause was an expansion of Miller’s: it exempted material with serious
religious, educational, journalistic, or historical value, in addition to that with serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.88
Despite tracking the constitutionally-approved Miller standard, the Court found all three
of Section 48’s prongs unconstitutionally broad. First, the Court held the definition of depictions
of “animal cruelty” too broad because it included the “intentional killing . . . or wounding” of
animals, which can be done humanely.89 The Court rejected that “killing or wounding” should
be construed together with the requirements that the underlying conduct to be cruel and illegal,
because neither term was facially ambiguous (an apparent pre-requisite for construing statutes as
a whole).90 This is inapposite to its interpretation of Miller; i.e., those displays of sexual conduct
(one element of Miller) which not appeal to the prurient interest (a separate element of Miller) do
not fall within the definition of obscenity because Miller’s elements are read together.
Second, the Court asserted that a lack of consensus as to what constitutes a depiction of
85
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“cruelty” rendered illegality an unconstitutionally broad reference point. The Court averred that
“although there may be ‘a broad societal consensus’ against cruelty to animals . . . there is
substantial disagreement on what types of conduct are properly regarded as cruel.”91 As proof of
non-consensus, the Court contrasted hunting regulations in several states,92 ignoring that the
educational and historical value of hunting depictions would exempt them from Section 48 and
that all 50 states have laws criminalizing (and therefore defining) animal cruelty. Why, then,
didn't the Court contrast animal cruelty laws rather than hunting laws to show non-consensus? I
believe that the Court wanted to garner as much support for its conclusion as possible, and in
light of the venerable position hunting holds in this nation’s psyche, arguing that hunting would
be adversely affected by Section 48 would do just that.93 A blanket assertion of non-consensus
as to what is “cruel” is unreasonable when resulting from comparison of irrelevant hunting
statutes; irresponsible when made in the face of available data appropriate to assessing a
consensus about cruelty; and hypocritical when compared to the constitutionally-sanctioned
presumption of a consensus regarding what sexual conduct is prurient and offensive.
Finally, the Court found the exceptions clause too broad. In short, the Stevens Court
rejected the Miller standard of “serious” social value as unreasonably high for non-sexual
material, despite its constitutionality when applied to sexual material: “In Miller we held that
serious value shields depictions of sex from regulation as obscenity. . . . We did not, however,
determine that serious value could be used as a general precondition to protecting other types of
speech in the first place.”94 Again, the Stevens Court contorts language in its favor: despite that
Section 48’s exceptions clause is just that—a list of exceptions to the statute, akin to Miller’s
91
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exceptions—the Court incorrectly characterizes it as a “general precondition to protecti[on]” to
weaken the analogy to obscenity.
The second case, Brown v. Entertainment Merchant’s Association,95 was handed down
one year after Stevens. In Brown, the Supreme Court struck down a California law that limited
minors’ access to violent video games on two main grounds. First, the law was a content-based
restriction on speech which was neither a “simple adjustment” to an existing category of
unprotected speech, nor merited establishing a new unprotected category.96 Thus, it was subject
to strict scrutiny. Second, the Court held that the state’s purported interest in preventing
psychological harm to minors caused by playing violent video was not supported by empirical
data.97 Moreover, even if the law did prevent some such harm, it both under- and over-inclusive
and hence not narrowly tailored enough to pass strict scrutiny analysis.98
The California law forbid the sale or rental of a “violent video game” to a minor without
the consent of a parent or other guardian, covering only games in which a player's “range of
options” included “killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a human
being.”99 Furthermore, the ban was limited to depictions of violence which (i) “appeal[] to a
deviant or morbid interest of minors,” as found by a “reasonable person, considering the game as
a whole”; (ii) are “patently offensive to prevailing standards in the community” for minors; and
(iii) prevent the game as a whole from having “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value for minors.”100 The only differences, then, between the California law and Miller’s
obscenity standard is the replacement of “prurient interest” with “deviant or morbid interest,” the
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replacement of “contemporary community standards” with a “reasonable person” standard, and
the addition of language limiting the inquiry “as to minors.” Of course, the law also did not
specifically target sexual conduct; indeed, that the law attempted to prevent non-sexual harm to
minors was its downfall.
Unlike Ginsberg, the Court said, the regulation on violent video games “does not adjust
the boundaries of an existing category of unprotected speech to ensure that a definition designed
for adults is not uncritically applied to children.”101 The statute that was upheld in Ginsberg was,
the Court emphasizes, “a prohibition on the sale to minors of sexual material that would be
obscene from the perspective of a child.”102 In other words, the Brown Court held that rational
legislative judgments about what materials cause moral harm to minors will be upheld if
regulating sexual materials, because the regulation of sexual materials is grounded in traditional
obscenity jurisprudence.103 And just as the Court rejected the attempt in Stevens to “shoehorn”
speech about animal cruelty into the category of the “obscene,” it rejected California's “attempt
to make violent-speech regulation look like obscenity regulation”:104
Our cases have been clear that the obscenity exception to the First Amendment
does not cover whatever a legislature finds shocking, but only depictions of
“sexual conduct” . . . Our opinion in Winters made clear that violence is not part
of the obscenity that the Constitution permits to be regulated.105
Notably, the Brown Court unambiguously interpreted Winters to stand for the proposition that all
violent speech constitutes “no indecency or obscenity heretofore known to the law.”106 This
reading is flawed. That Winters quote was not intended to say that violent speech can never be

101

Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735.
Id.
103
Id. at 2736 (citing Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975)).
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2735.
102

20

regulated in the absence of precedent, nor that violent speech is never obscene, but rather to
explain that a lack of precedent rendered that particular statute unconstitutionally vague.107
Specifically, the Winters Court found that the language criminalizing the sale of violent stories
only where such stories were “so massed [i.e., compiled] as to incite to crime” could not give
notice of the illegal behavior because that phrase had “no technical or common law meaning.
Nor can the meaning be gained from the section as a whole or the Article of the Penal Law under
which it appears.”108 Thus, if the statute had defined its terms or articulated what quantity of
violent stories was considered sufficient to “incite to crime,” the Winters Court may have upheld
its constitutionality despite its regulation of violent expression.
However, the Brown Court interpreted Winters together with Stevens to hold that
historical precedent is a prerequisite for carving out new categories of unprotected speech; a
legislative social cost-benefit analysis is insufficient.109 The Court in Brown stated that “without
persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore
unrecognized) tradition of proscription, a legislature may not revise the judgment [of] the
American people,” embodied in the First Amendment, “that the benefits of its restrictions on the
Government outweigh the costs.”110 The Brown Court stated that it might entertain the creation
of a new exception for “violent-as-to-minors” speech “if there were a long-standing tradition in
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this country of specially restricting children's access to depictions of violence.”111 Pedantically
citing to Grimm’s Fairy Tales, Saturday morning cartoons, and Homer’s Odyssey, the Court held
that there is no such tradition.112 As a result, California’s law regulating the sale of violent video
games to minors was held a run-of-the-mill “restriction on the content of protected speech” and
was struck down under the full weight of a strict scrutiny analysis.113
4. Why Violent Expression Cannot Be Regulated Without Sex
First, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court was following a clear trend in refusing to
find violent speech outside the First Amendment in Stevens and Brown. Nearly all the federal
courts have refused in recent years to find violent but non-sexual speech obscene. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in declaring unconstitutional a Missouri statute
that prohibited the rental or sale of violent movies to minors, held that obscenity only includes
expressions of a sexual nature, and that material containing violence, but not sex, is not
obscene.114 The Second Circuit refused to recognize as obscene trading cards that depict
“heinous crime.”115 The Sixth Circuit would not expand its obscenity jurisprudence to include
violent rather than sexually explicit content in video games, movies, and Internet websites.116
The Seventh Circuit declared that obscene speech and speech that conveys violence “are distinct
categories of objectionable depiction.”117 But if both categories constitute “objectionable
depictions,” why is only sexual speech undeserving of First Amendment protection?
The Supreme Court, through Stevens and Brown, has sent a clear message: violent
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expression cannot be regulated. While obscenity was removed from the First Amendment
because of the moral harm it causes,118 moral harm alone can never again be grounds for
exclusion. By additionally requiring a tradition of suppression to establish new unprotected
categories,119 the Court is functionally preventing the formation of any new categories of speech.
States must defend their regulations by analogy to existing categories of unprotected speech
because the Court is openly loath to find new ones. Yet analogies to existing obscenity doctrine
are not successful unless the regulated speech is sexual.120 Unless a legislature comes forward
with data showing a history of suppressing depictions of violence, the Supreme Court has shown
that it will apply the strictest scrutiny to regulation of violent speech.121 In Part III, I submit that
the history and tradition requirement is pre-textual, and that the Court’s hesitance to exclude
violent speech from the First Amendment stems from a refusal to offend the prevailing notion of
masculinity in America.

III. OBSCENITY JURISPRUDENCE REPRESENTS A GENDERED POLICY.
The disparate treatment of sex and violence under current obscenity jurisprudence can be
seen as a manifestation of gender bias in at least four different ways. First, Miller’s reliance on
community standards to define what material is offensive to the point of obscene necessarily
incorporates outdated, if still widely accepted, gender stereotypes regarding “proper” sexual
conduct. Second, by limiting obscenity to expression about sex, the Supreme Court has codified
into constitutional law the idea that sex—in particular, female sexuality—is too immoral and
118
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offensive a topic for public discourse. Third, and conversely, by expressly refusing to regulate
violent expression, the Court furthers a male-centric, normative message that violence is not
taboo but acceptable in public discourse, and ignores social harms which uniquely befall women.
It is helpful to begin by identifying the normative stereotypes which pervade all four forms of
gender bias before discussing each in turn.
A. Prevailing Gender Stereotypes
For millennia, dominant social groups have used gender stereotypes to control
subordinate groups by exerting normative pressure to conform to a chosen, typically unattainable
ideal.122 In America, men are the dominant social group. Subsequently, men control the
normative view of what it means to be masculine or feminine, including the degree to which
sexuality and violence are considered acceptable and attractive. Exploration of these stereotypes
is necessary for understanding how obscenity laws permit men to retain their control, and how
that control leads to the continued subordination of women.
Gender stereotypes, as with all stereotypes, are contextual and idealized.123 Descriptive
stereotypes describe how an individual is presumed to act based on a particular trait,124 as when
all blondes are presumed to be stupid. Prescriptive stereotypes describe how an individual
should act based on that trait,125 as when a new mother is sent home early from work because
“her place is at home with her child.”126 Prescriptive gender stereotypes exert the normative
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pressure that functions to control, and ultimately subordinate, women, and are hence discussed
below.
1. American concept of masculinity
A singular ideal of masculinity is called “hegemonic masculinity.”127 That is, although
individuals “experience different forms of masculinity within particular contexts, one form of
masculinity often exerts the most [social] pressure to conform to it. ‘Hegemonic’ masculinity is
that masculinity and it works to subordinate both women and non-hegemonically masculine
men.”128 In other words, “hegemonic masculinity is the currently most honored way of being a
man.”129 In America, it is the “white heterosexual middle- and upper-class men who occupy
order-giving positions in the institutions they control—particularly economic, political, and
military institutions—[who] produce [the] hegemonic masculinity that is glorified throughout the
culture.”130 The American prescription of the ideal man includes three central characteristics:
masculine men are decidedly non-feminine, overtly heterosexual, and have a propensity for
physical violence or aggression.131
The first characteristic, “not feminine,” makes sense. Indeed, most gender theorists
acknowledge the simple fact that the dominant notion of being masculine means “doing things
that cannot and should not be done by women.”132 Ultimately, masculinity requires men to
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“make it clear—eternally, compulsively, decidedly—that they are not ‘like’ women.”133 This
characteristic is used to control and subordinate women because men seeking to reach the
masculine ideal “reserve many socially important activities for men, [and] believe that women
are unable to do many of the ‘important’ things that contribute to society.”134 There are
countless historic examples of men reserving socially important functions for themselves;
notable among them are the rights to vote, enter contracts, and own property, as well as the
traditional distinction between “women’s work” (domestic work done in the home, which
necessarily makes lesser contributions to society) and “men’s work” (all work outside the home,
which necessarily makes greater contributions to society).135 A contemporary example is seen in
the divergent standards for attractiveness between the sexes. Masculine men do not wear
makeup, shoes, or clothes that are meant to “improve” their attractiveness; the attractiveness of
masculine men is determined by their natural features.136 In contrast, feminine women wear
makeup to improve their facial features, bras to keep their breasts at teen-height, heels to make
their legs longer and butts perkier, shapewear to keep their silhouettes smooth and hourglassshaped, and style their long hair to comply with attractiveness standards set by men.137 Women
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who buck this standard are not only seen as unattractive, but unprofessional as well.138
In addition to reserving socially important activities for men, legal codification of male
“otherness” also subordinates women vis-à-vis the natural tendency to treat “otherness” with
skepticism and distrust.139 The limitations on women’s participation in the military provide an
important illustration. Being able to defend one’s country with arms has historically been linked
with fulfilling core duties of American citizenship, yet women are excluded from participation in
ground combat and draft registration.140 This exclusion sends the message that, literally, men are
full citizens in their military eligibility as compared to women.141 Exclusion also affords men
more opportunities for leadership than women because of their ability to fully participate.142 A
Special Operations sergeant testified that female exclusion is necessary because “the warrior
mentality will crumble if women are placed in combat positions . . . . There needs to be that
belief that ‘I can do this because nobody else can.”’143 In sum, central to the notion of what it
means to be masculine is the ability to do things that are socially valued and equally unfeminine.
Second, the masculine ideal requires that men be visibly heterosexual. Catharine
MacKinnon has argued that compulsory heterosexuality is an important part of hegemonic
masculinity because it “keeps women sexually for men and men sexually inviolable.”144 Michael
Kimmel submits that “homophobia and sexism go hand in hand” because when “men fear that
138
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they will be perceived as gay by other men and thus ‘not a real man,’ [they] will exaggerate all
the traditional rules of masculinity, including sexual predation with women.”145 Indeed, men
who do not sufficiently exhibit their heterosexuality, regardless of their actual sexual orientation,
may find themselves victims of persecution and even violence from “more masculine” men.146
Assumed heterosexuality is rampant in society147 and the law is no exception. For example,
assumed heterosexuality is one of the basic reasons behind the sex segregation of prisons,
because men as presumed heterosexuals will necessarily seek out sex with women, either
consensually or non-consensually.148 It also plays an important role in laws that prohibit men
from conducting searches of women or from being guards in women’s prisons.149 Legal
philosopher Richard A. Wasserstrom has written that even sex-segregated bathrooms use
presumptive heterosexuality to further the dominance of men: “The case against [sex-segregated
bathrooms] now would rest on the ground that they are, perhaps, one small part of that scheme of
sex-role differentiation which uses the mystery of sexual anatomy, among other things, to
maintain the primacy of heterosexual sexual attraction [that is] central to patriarchy.”150
But perhaps the most prominent characteristic of masculinity is the propensity for
physical aggression. Physical aggression is likely the most prominent characteristic of
masculinity because it was the principal reason for man’s initial ability to literally dominate
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women,151 and instantiates the power and control men retain.152 While we are tens of thousands
of years past our caveman days (itself an insidious manifestation of the masculine stereotype),
men who are the biggest and strongest are still given the highest status in American society.153
For example, the multiple millions of dollars and ludicrous amount of attention we pay
professional athletes—notably, only male athletes—for their feats of athleticism is an excellent
demonstration. Another is the fact that no President of the United States has ever been under six
feet tall, even when such a height was extremely above average in the Eighteenth century (this,
rather than overt assumptions of incompetence, may better explain why we have never had a
female president).154 Boundless examples aside, scholars agree that “physical dominance,
aggressiveness, and the use of violence to maintain male power constitute a central feature in the
definitions of hegemonic masculinity.”155
Commentators have also argued that requiring both heterosexuality and physical
aggression to be considered masculine places men in a double bind: in order to be true men, they
must not be homosexual; yet many paths toward masculinity—such as sport, battle, and
mentorship—involve just the sort of close, emotionally intense, and physically-oriented
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relationships that subject men to the suspicion that they are homosexual.156 As Angela Harris
describes it, “the instability of masculine identity under these circumstances makes insecure men
easily manipulable (anxious and eager to prove their masculinity) and potentially violent (for not
only status but also personal identity itself is at stake).”157 Thus, any natural propensity in men
for violence is culturally exacerbated in America because this double bind creates constant doubt
about a man’s gender identity, resulting in a cultural requirement that men constantly prove their
manhood—to women and especially to other men—in order to be accepted as men.
Just as this stereotype did not arise in a vacuum, neither is its perpetuation completely
unfounded; it is unquestionable that men on the whole tend to commit violent and aggressive
acts more than women.158 Indeed, “gender has consistently been advanced by criminologists as
the strongest predictor of criminal involvement.”159 Notably, while women do commit crimes
and other violent acts, they are significantly less likely to do so to prove their femininity the way
men do so to prove their masculinity.160 Harris writes,
Ordinarily law-abiding and peaceful men may find themselves committing violent
criminal acts when (in public settings) their manhood is threatened by conflict
with other men or when (in private settings) women threaten to reveal them as
sexually inadequate, fail to submit to their patriarchal authority, or threaten to
leave them. In these situations, the potential loss of masculinity brings shame and
humiliation, and the man who finds these emotions intolerable may turn them into
rage and act violently in expression of that rage.161
The law plays a significant role in reinforcing the stereotype that masculine men have a
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propensity for violence. That women are disallowed from combat positions in the military sends
the message that men are uniquely suited for fighting. Men are often prohibited from acting as
guards to women prisoners because “men are sexual predators.”162 Yet, in Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 163 the Supreme Court held that women could be barred from serving as prison
guards to male inmates on the exact same grounds. In the eyes of the law, then, men are the
aggressors whether they are guards or inmates. Statutory rape laws presume the sexual predation
of men on young women.164 Murder is mitigated to manslaughter when committed in the “heat
of passion,” which both accepts and excuses that men may react violently to unmanageable
emotions.165 The doctrines of incitement and fighting words similarly rely on the assumption that
men will readily react to certain words with physical violence. Naturally, the words that most
often fall under the definition of fighting words are those that threaten the listener’s
masculinity.166 Even where the law does not facially project this stereotype, its implementation
picks up the slack. For example, research suggests that police are twice as likely to arrest male
perpetrators of domestic violence than female perpetrators.167 This stereotypical femalevictim/male-aggressor dichotomy pathologizes female violence and normalizes male violence,
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thus reinforcing hegemonic masculinity.168 In sum, the American ideal of masculinity requires
men to be decisively non-feminine, visibly heterosexual, and ready, willing, and able to be
violent. The law perpetuates these stereotypes when it incorporates gender norms into legal
standards.
2. American concept of femininity
The American construct of femininity can be seen as the converse of American
masculinity. Hegemonic femininity and masculinity are mirror images of one another because
men, as the dominant social group, defined both; women have never defined for themselves what
is ideally feminine in Western society.169 Thus, if the masculine ideal is defined by a distinction
from that which is feminine, a requirement of explicit heterosexual overtures, and a propensity
for violence, ideal femininity is conversely defined by a distinction from masculinity, a cabining
of overt sexuality, and a propensity for docility and nurturance.
The first trait imperative to hegemonic femininity is non-masculinity. Having decided
that overt sexuality and violent tendencies define manhood, men socially proscribed these traits
for women.170 Hence, feminine women do not display an appetite for sex or aggression. It is
unsurprising that non-masculinity requires passivity; dominant social groups select self-serving
and unattainable standards for subordinate groups in order to control them.171 The more
unsustainable the standard, the more effectively it controls the group attempting—and failing—
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to meet it.172 As Catherine MacKinnon writes:
The discovery that the female archetype is the feminine stereotype exposed
“woman” as a [male] social construction. Contemporary industrial society’s
version of her is docile, soft, passive, nurturant, vulnerable, weak, narcissistic,
childlike, incompetent, masochistic, and domestic . . . . Women who resist or fail
[to meet this standard] are considered less female, lesser women. Women who
comply or succeed are elevated as models, tokenized if they succeed on male
terms or portrayed as [having] consent[ed] to their “natural place” and dismissed
if they complain.173
MacKinnon further submits that, when taken in context, “every element of the female gender
role is revealed as, in fact, sexual.”174 According to MacKinnon, men sexually prefer those
women who are completely void of sexual autonomy, and set the ideal feminine archetype
accordingly.175 I submit that MacKinnon’s view is correct, but incomplete. The female gender
role was carved by male sexual preferences, but the subservience and passivity requirements are
at least as much about retaining social control as about sex. That is, even if all men preferred
sexually aggressive women, idealizing that trait would encourage women to be both overtly
sexual and overtly aggressive. This is inapposite to the hegemonic masculinity requirement that
men—and men only—are overtly sexual and aggressive. Thus, under hegemonic femininity,
women are considered masculine, and therefore unattractive, if they openly display either
sexuality or aggression.176
The Supreme Court’s leading decision on gender stereotype-based discrimination
demonstrates how hegemonic femininity proscribes aggression and requires nurturance of
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women. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,177 plaintiff Hopkins was denied partnership at her
accounting firm despite billing more hours and bringing in more business than any other
candidate.178 Clients had given her high ratings and described her as “extremely competent,
intelligent, strong and forthright, very productive, energetic and creative . . . decisive[], and . . . a
stimulating conversationalist.”179 Opposition to her partnership was based solely on a perceived
lack of warmth and “interpersonal skills,” rather than objective job performance.180 In her
evaluations, partners wrote that Hopkins was “overbearing, arrogant, [and] abrasive,” and
“overly aggressive, unduly harsh, [and] difficult to work with.”181 In the words of the Court,
“one partner described her as ‘macho’; another suggested that she ‘overcompensated for being a
woman’; a third advised her to take ‘a course in charm school.’”182 Several of the male
candidates were also characterized as abrasive and overbearing, though “no one suggested charm
school for them.”183 Despite Hopkins’ “work-related competence (or perhaps because of it), she
was seen as behaving in ways that are considered inappropriate for women.”184 Although
Hopkins prevailed after seven years, most of the judges deemed hers a “close case” of
discrimination.185
The non-masculinity requirement proscribes more than just aggression for women. A
study of male and female leaders shows that women who act authoritatively will be viewed as
masculine—and subsequently scorned—despite that such a trait is desirable in a leader:
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[F]emale leaders were devalued relative to men when they behaved in an
autocratic and directive manner and when they worked in male-dominated fields
(e.g., in the military, as athletic coaches). By contrast, women who led in a
participatory or democratic style were evaluated as positively as their male
counterparts. Thus, the devaluation of female leaders was restricted to incidents in
which women behaved in ways that were stereotypically masculine, behaviors
that may have disrupted “traditional patterns of gender deference.” . . . Such
women may be particularly vulnerable to having their interpersonal abilities and
personality derogated, although their work-related, instrumental strengths may be
acknowledged.186
Additionally, the study revealed that men have a greater tendency to hold traditional prescriptive
beliefs that women “should not act like men”; they will scorn a woman who bucks the feminine
ideal more quickly and more severely than will other women.187
The second trait imperative to femininity, concerning female sexuality, is two-fold: its
descriptive component sees women as inherently, dangerously sexual;188 its prescriptive
component requires constant restraint of this unbridled sexuality.189 This ideology portrays nonprocreative sex as sinful and women as beholden to their sexual impulses—and therefore in
perpetual need of societal control.190 Women are thus socially categorized by whether they cave
to their sexual natures; there are “bad” girls whose sexuality tempts men to sin, depravity, and
squalor, and “good” girls who tolerate sex for procreation but do not engage in it for selffulfillment, let alone outside of male-prescribed parameters.191 The “good/bad girl” division is
manifested in a multitude of female stereotypes: a woman is either madonna or whore, virgin or
186
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vamp, helpless schoolgirl or lust-crazed dominatrix. Even the Supreme Court has characterized
this dichotomy as “one of the most insidious of the old myths about women[;] that women,
wittingly or not, are seductive sexual objects [or] . . . placed upon a pedestal[.]”192
While hegemonic masculinity requires men to display their heterosexuality to the point of
conspicuousness, the open display of sexuality by women is considered “profoundly dangerous
to men and to civilization.”193 Woman’s sinful sexuality constantly tempts men not merely
toward immorality, but “away from the business of creating and maintaining civilization, from
pursuit of science, of government, of war, of commerce, and of invention. If women are not
supervised and controlled, if their unruly sexuality is not repressed and regulated (for it cannot be
tamed), civilization itself will fall.”194
This ideology is reflected in the societal and legal treatment of women throughout
history. American women seeking sexual autonomy have been publicly branded, stoned,
sequestered, institutionalized as insane, jailed as prostitutes, burned as witches, and driven to
suicide by persecution.195 While male adulterers “did not deserve” death for their transgression,
a wronged husband may have been entitled to exact such a punishment on his unfaithful wife.196
Statutory rape laws arose not merely out of a paternalistic concern to protect young women from
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exploitation, but at least as much from the desire to “control their burgeoning sexuality.”197
Married women could not be trusted with such basic freedoms as the right to own property, to
vote, to sign contracts, or to have custody of children,198 both because women were deemed to
lack the intellectual capacity to contribute, and because their sex-driven impulses would
“misguide, deceive, or drain mankind and keep him from his weighty accomplishments.”199
Nineteenth- and twentieth-century women were punished for seeking freer sexual expression in
dress, dating, dance, and domestic life, as well as fighting against sexual double standards that
created “fallen” women out of girls raped, seduced, or simply sexually active.200 Social “purity”
movements have been periodically “necessary” to ensure that all sexual expression by women
was stamped out.201
Although Western women have gained many social and political rights previously denied
them, the sin-sex nexus202 continues to limit women’s full social and legal participation.203 The
hegemonic femininity requirement that women cabin their sexuality results in the repression of
their sexual autonomy. When the law steps in to regulate female sexuality in ways it does not
(and I submit will never) regulate male sexuality, it is reflecting hegemonic femininity in a way
197
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that heartily contributes to the suppression of female sexual autonomy.
Most laws regulate female sexuality indirectly; the most direct are those that obstruct
access to contraception and abortion, which leave women but not men threatened with unwanted
pregnancy.204 Scholars argue that a traditional double standard, which requires premarital
chastity and marital fidelity of women but not of men, animates much abortion regulation.205
Courts and legislatures take for granted that government intervention into women’s decisionmaking to prevent pregnancy is a legitimate means to a legitimate societal goal.206 While men
are “not punished” for premarital sex, “‘moral’ considerations justify laws that impose
devastating legal, social, financial, and health consequences upon women who become pregnant
through ‘disfavored’ sex.”207 Significantly, that most abortion laws allow an abortion when the
pregnancy results from rape or incest208 reflects the legal consideration of pregnancy and
parenthood as “just deserts” for women who choose to have sex. That is, only where sex is
involuntary and outside male-sanctioned parameters does a woman “deserve” to be allowed an
abortion; if she got pregnant while exercising sexual autonomy, she loses the privilege of
choosing not to have the child. Recent trends in abortion regulation like outright bans on certain
types of abortions,209 mandatory “waiting periods,”210 and parental or spousal notification
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provisions211 have only served to underscore the hegemonic femininity stereotype that women
cannot and should not make sexual decisions for themselves.
Moreover, the law furthers hegemonic femininity by suppressing female sexual
autonomy in its regulation of sexual education and information. The federal government spends
hundreds of millions of dollars yearly on “abstinence-only-until-marriage” programs given to
young people in public schools, churches, and community centers.212 These programs instruct
that all birth control is dangerous, condoms are ineffective in preventing pregnancy, and that
HIV and other STDs can pass through a condom.213 Kim Buchanan argues that
[r]ather than challenging societal expectations of male sexual irresponsibility and
punitive attitudes toward women who are sexually active, [abstinence-only]
programs reinforce this double standard in the hope that it will force young
women to stop themselves from having sex. Accordingly, these programs teach
that premarital sex inevitably results in financial and emotional ruin for young
women, while enhancing the reputation of young men.214
Likewise, “marriage promotion curricula” funded by the federal government seek to
mandate the sexual behavior of young and low-income women under the Welfare Reform Act.215
The Congressional findings supporting this legislation explicitly attribute poverty to unwed
pregnancy and unwed motherhood.216 Such federally funded programs pressure poor women—
but not men—to get married as a strategy for escaping poverty, yet fail to offer any economic
guidance from which women (or their prospective husbands) might learn to support themselves
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and their children.217 Similarly, if a woman wants to avoid punitive “family cap” reductions in
benefits for giving birth while on welfare, she must use a method of contraception that cannot be
reversed except by medical intervention.218 If she uses a less invasive method of birth control
such as oral contraceptives or condoms, she and her children will be subject to a reduction in
benefits.219 The Welfare Reform Act thus signals that sexual abstinence of women, but not of
men, is more integral to ending poverty than financial education. By limiting women’s access to
birth control, abortions, and, most significantly, accurate information about their own health, the
law suppresses female sexuality in order to comport with the prevailing stereotype of femininity.
In sum, hegemonic femininity exerts normative pressure on women to behave unlike
men, cabin their sexual urges, and be passive rather than aggressive.
B. Gender Bias #1 – Insidious “Community Standards”
The constitutional obscenity standard, aka the inherent morality standard, explicitly
permits and implicitly requires that these prescriptive gender stereotypes are encompassed in the
definition of obscenity. That is, material is deemed obscene if it is patently offensive according
to “community standards.” The problem is that the community standards themselves are not
proved to the jury as an element of the offense, but rather are decided by the jury.220 Jurors are
thus able—and more importantly, are required—to subsume whatever biases about “proper”
sexual conduct are held in the community into the constitutional standard for obscenity.
While courts may technically admit evidence of community standards, such evidence is
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regularly excluded.221 Hence, the opportunity to discriminate arises because the jury is presumed
to know the community standards. This problem is compounded by the fact that jurors are not
meant to apply their own sense of offensiveness, but to apply the offensiveness standards of the
mythical “average person” in their community.222 Such guesstimating is routine in some areas of
the law, as when the knowledge of a “reasonable person” is imputed to a defendant charged with
negligence.223 However, that “reasonable person” standard is designed to limit jurors’ biases by
requiring them to imagine what a less-biased (i.e., more reasonable) person would do in the
circumstance presented.224 In contrast, the standard for defining community standards does not
ask jurors to set aside their biases; rather, it requires that they incorporate into the constitutional
standard not only their individual bias, but all biases known or apparent in their community.
It is imprudent to disregard the fact that people are influenced, sometimes
subconsciously, by their perception of the opinions, values, and expectations of others. As Diana
Burgess and Eugene Borgida write:
[S]tereotypes are learned sociocultural representations that may continue to be
held even when individuals do not personally endorse them. Even a person who
holds egalitarian beliefs about what is appropriate for men and women possesses
descriptive knowledge of the characteristics, roles, and behaviors that constitute
gender stereotypes. Even for those who claim to endorse equal rights,
liberalization of (gender) roles and the like, stereotypic associations to gender are
virtually automatic, emerging without any obvious conscious processing when a
person is confronted with a member of the category.225
Similarly, a study by James Fields and Howard Schuman strongly suggests that people look out
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into the community and see their own opinions reflected back.226 Thus, there is a strong
tendency to perceive community agreement with one’s self, because people impute their own
opinions to the community at large. Perceived self-community agreement is exacerbated in the
absence of information to the contrary,227 as is the case in the majority of obscenity cases.228 In
addition to projecting their own views, jurors are also likely to shift their opinion of
offensiveness toward what they believe is the most mainstream view of appropriate sexual
conduct in an attempt to reflect a broad cross-section of their community.229 Moreover, jury
selection typically serves to aggravate, rather than mitigate, the weight of private biases.230 For
example, one manual to assist prosecutors in selecting a jury for an obscenity reads as follows:
[A] juror with the following characteristics would be ideal: (1) a native of the
community, or in the alternative, originally from a smaller town or community;
(2) married people with families, especially those with daughters, granddaughters,
and/or small children or grandchildren; (3) active church members; (4) at least 40
years of age; (5) active in community clubs and activities; (6) presently living in a
small community; (7) little or no exposure to pornography; (8) politically
conservative; (9) agreement with the state’s right to enact obscenity and child
pornography laws; (10) people who own their own homes rather than rent.231
Prosecutors would want to select these obviously conservative jurors as they are more likely to
convict than those with more open-minded views on what sexual conduct is offensive.232 While
defense counsel would naturally seek to select jurors with liberal or minority views on sexuality,
it is unlikely defense counsel would able to ensure they remain on the jury; attorneys can strike
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jurors, not prevent them from being struck and the prosecutor may have enough peremptory
strikes to remove them.233 It is easy to see, then, how effortlessly long-standing sexual
stereotypes are incorporated into the constitutional definition of obscenity.
C. Gender Bias #2: Keeping Sex Taboo Enforces Negative Sexual Stereotypes
Central to the concept of obscenity is that some materials should not be available for
public consumption. Thus, the inherent morality standard essentially asks whether the
objectionable material is best left “behind the curtain of privacy which our customs draw[.]”234
By limiting the scope of obscenity jurisprudence to speech about sex, the Supreme Court has
codified into constitutional law the idea that sex—and in particular, female sexuality—is too
immoral and offensive a topic for public discourse. In practice, keeping sex taboo forces juries
in obscenity cases to rely on normative sexual stereotypes because the lack of public discourse
precludes basing “community standards” on actual community practices. And when the
prevailing sexual stereotypes consider overt female sexuality taboo, obscenity laws function to
stifle women’s sexual autonomy and perpetuate their subordination.
1. Societal Function of Sexual Taboos
In her book, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo, Mary
Douglas submits that a culture will find taboo those things that challenge its fundamental
conceptual categories.235 In other words, if something profoundly troubles the self-identity of
the members of the culture, the culture will find that thing “unnatural,” and its presence will
trigger deep disgust.236 As the dominant social group defines these normative categories, its
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members are both more likely to be offended by challenges to existing categories, and are bestsituated to quash such challenges.237 Moreover, dominant social groups naturally draw
normative distinctions that are self-serving.238
In America, sexually explicit material is taboo because it challenges the fundamental
categorization of our lives into separate spheres of private and public life.239 That is, societal
norms dictate what details about our sexuality should be known to others (i.e., our public lives)
and what should remain behind closed doors (i.e., our private lives). Significantly, however,
sexual norms vary for different groups of people. For example, heterosexual couples can hold
hands and kiss in public without fear of offending social mores, while the same cannot be said
for homosexual couples in many parts of this country.240 Likewise, hegemonic masculinity and
femininity instruct that men may publicly display their sexual selves, while women may not.241
In other words, the traditional “public sex life” sphere is much larger for men than it is for
women, who must cabin their sexuality or be seen as unfeminine. Hence, when any of us
transgresses the normative sexual stereotypes encompassed in hegemonic masculinity and
femininity, we challenge the very identity of the controlling social group. When that
transgression involves an explicit public look at something hegemonic masculinity deems
private—such as an unabashed exhibition of female sexual autonomy—it is called obscene.242
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The real-world impact of sexual taboos cannot be overstated. Theorists of sexuality long
ago explained the importance of prohibition to sexual desire. Sigmund Freud wrote: “Some
obstacle is necessary to swell the tide of the libido to its height; and at all periods of history,
wherever natural barriers in the way of satisfaction have not sufficed, mankind has erected
conventional ones in order to be able to enjoy love.”243 Georges Bataille argued that the pleasure
of pornography depends on an accompanying prohibition that it appears to transgress.244 In
short, taboos are like a metaphorical car accident; the more we’re told to avert our eyes, the more
fascinated we become with stealing a peek. In this way, sexually explicit material gains rather
than loses social significance when it is proscribed.245 Indeed, Professor Meyer argues that the
subordinating nature of pornography is due at least as much to its taboo nature, which renders its
private viewing a male-only event, as to its misogynist content.246
More importantly, however, recent research has affirmatively proven a causal connection
between legally-sanctioned taboos and actual moral beliefs of the public:
Little is known regarding what obscenity laws do and whether the rationales put
forth by policy-makers are empirically justified. If [obscenity standards] give
people more room for sexually progressive expression and greater social
acceptance of alternative behaviors, then more progressive community standards
would make it easier to subsequently challenge restrictive obscenity regulations,
leading to multiple steady states through which abrupt shifts in norms can occur. .
243
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. . Using the random assignment of U.S. federal judges . . . we found that
progressive obscenity standards increase progressive sexual attitudes, non-marital
sexual behavior especially by men, arrests for prostitution, rape, and drug
violations, [but] . . . reduc[ed] arrests for offenses against family and children. . . .
To corroborate a causal channel we conduct a field experiment by assigning
workers to transcribe obscenity news reports. Exposure to progressive obscenity
decisions leads to more progressive sexual attitudes but not to self-reported sexual
behavior. A second field experiment documents that exposure to conservative
obscenity decisions leads to beliefs that premarital, extramarital, and homosexual
sex are more prevalent.247
In short, then, obscenity jurisprudence influences the public’s actual beliefs and values,
illuminating the boundary between acceptable and obscene. By singling out depictions of sexual
activity as the only material offensive enough to be obscene, obscenity law signals that “the
sexual is sinful, and that eros—female eros in particular—is not only problematic, but also a
central source of social evil.”248
2. Suppressing Sexual Discourse Suppresses Female Sexuality
How suppressing only speech about sex eschews female sexuality can be explained in
two ways. First, the “community standards” prong of the inherent morality standard ensures that
a singular majoritarian (i.e., male) view of sexual morality prevails over all others. Second, from
its inception until current day, every development of obscenity law grew out of a conservative
movement to stop the democratization and liberation of female sexuality.
First, “community standards” are meant to be the legally-sanctioned boundary between
our public and private sexual lives.249 Yet it is impossible to define a community’s standards
regarding a taboo subject matter without reliance on stereotypes. That is, community standards
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cannot be based on actual beliefs and practices in the absence of some community discourse.
For example, a jury could easily agree on a community standard about the proper driving of a car
because people generally will openly discuss their own and others’ driving behavior; we know
what our neighbors think is good and bad driving. In contrast, so long as sex is taboo, sexuality
is not openly discussed and deliberated by the community; we know much less about what our
neighbors think about the extreme sexual behavior likely to be at issue in an obscenity case.
Subsequently, juries must use the normative boundaries selected by the dominant social group to
inform their decision because the lack of public discourse about sex precludes basing
“community standards” on actual community beliefs and practices. In this way, keeping sex
taboo mandates the perpetuation of sexual stereotypes, and results in the continued suppression
of female sexuality in accordance with those stereotypes.250
Second, obscenity law has developed reactively, as opposed to proactively. Scholars
generally agree on the timeline of its development, which shows that both the legal theory and
prosecution of obscenity have advanced periodically, rather than constantly.251 Obscenity law
first gained momentum around 1842, and remained a hot legal issue until the passage of the
Comstock Act in 1873, which banned obscene literature from the mail.252 A resulting climate of
sexual repression prevailed until around 1913, when federal judges began to openly question the
“rule as laid down, however consonant it may be with mid-Victorian morals.”253 This period
lasted until around 1930, when obscenity doctrine officially broke with its Victorian past by
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shifting to a “reasonable person” standard, rather than Hicklin’s “susceptible person” standard.254
Repression again prevailed until the late 1950’s, when the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Roth v. United States255 loosened restrictions on the sale of sexually explicit material
to adults.256 From 1957 on, obscenity has remained a popular topic of discussion. Of note, the
Miller standard was promulgated by the Court in 1973, when the modern feminist movement
was gaining ground. Then, theorists Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin attempted in
the 1980’s and 90’s to suppress pornography as a violation of women's civil rights.257 Today,
controversies over the ubiquitous availability of sexually explicit images and teen sexting
dominate the conversation.258
Significantly, each period of advancement in obscenity law corresponds with a social
movement advocating freer sexual expression, particularly for women. These progressive
movements are the very same that allowed women to gain civil rights previously denied them.
For every sexually progressive social movement, there was a corresponding conservative
backlash.259 In short, because men have never needed social permission or encouragement to
freely express their sexuality,260 the stifling of social progress toward freer sexual expression
functioned to stifle the sexuality of women only.
There was a “free love” movement in the mid-Nineteenth century—a “middle-class,
bohemian cause that opposed marriage and supported sexual relationships rooted in ‘passional
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attraction’ rather than law.”261 Women contemporaneously gained the rights to enter contracts,
execute wills, own or control property, work outside the home, and receive trade licenses.262 At
this time, a work was obscene if it had a “tendency to corrupt the morals”263 of a person
susceptible to offense at lewd materials. This vague standard prevailed throughout the
Nineteenth century, and might have rendered obscenity laws “an expansive tool” for the
proscription of an extremely broad range of purportedly dangerous or immoral materials.264 Yet
obscenity laws were not used to prosecute any and all materials that might be morally corruptive
to a susceptible audience. Instead, Nineteenth century obscenity prosecutions typically targeted
works describing “female sexual desire, knowledge, or pleasure, usually narrated by women in
the first person,”265 because such works were in contravention of the prevailing notions about the
supposedly innate chastity and lack of libido in women. As Professor Donna Dennis writes,
new middle-class norms that arose in the first half of the nineteenth century
prescribed sexual purity and “passionlessness” for women. Indeed, a primary
cultural achievement of the antebellum bourgeoisie was its assertion of
fundamental sexual differences between men and women. By eliding sexual
difference and highlighting feminine pleasure, erotic tales narrated by women flew
in the face of bourgeois conventions enshrining female piety and chastity.266
Moreover, a work need not have been erotic to be obscene in the Nineteenth century; obscenity
charges were triggered whenever there was an overt representation of feminine sexual agency.
For example, sellers of The Secrets of the Female Sex were frequently prosecuted, despite that
the book was an austere anti-masturbation tract.267 Apparently, “the book’s discussion of
sexually aroused girls and young women, even though it dwelled on the morbid consequences of
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their physical explorations, ran directly afoul of the emerging legal taboo against expressions of
female desire.”268
The next period of obscenity development was the 1920’s, which was similarly a time of
social and legal upheaval for women in America. During this era, the Nineteenth Amendment
granted women the right to vote, Alice Paul drafted the first Equal Rights Amendment, Margaret
Sanger founded the American Birth Control League, and, upon being allowed some formal
education, women gained recognition in male-dominated fields like politics,269 business,270
aviation,271 science,272 and literature.273 Moreover, the Jazz Age immediately drums up images
of flappers, those women who flouted traditional gender norms by cutting their hair short,
wearing masculine clothes, drinking hard liquor, smoking cigarettes, and having social lives
independent of men. While their mothers had devoted themselves to securing voting rights,
organizing unions, and establishing settlement houses, flappers “were interested in a different
form of liberation—the kind that gave them the right to enjoy themselves in the same ways men
did[.]”274 Outraged by the audacity of these sexually brazen women, and by the hedonism of the
time generally, an anti-obscenity movement grew out of the urban centers of the time.275
Prosecutions for obscenity rose, and literature condemning the effects of reading, seeing, or
learning about sex proliferated.276 Yet, the legal theory of obscenity saw progressive
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development. Dismissing the “Victorian morals” which the “susceptible person” standard277
represented, Judge Learned Hand suggested that honest treatment of sex ought not to be
proscribed, commenting that “it seems hardly likely that we are . . . content to reduce our
treatment of sex to the standard of a child’s library in the supposed interest of a salacious few, or
that shame will for long prevent us from adequate portrayal of some of the most serious and
beautiful sides of human nature.”278 But perhaps realizing that society was not yet ready for such
complete sexual honesty, he settled for arguing that “the word ‘obscene’ be allowed to indicate
the present critical point in the compromise between candor and shame at which the community
may have arrived here and now.”279
During World War II, the substantial population of American men who were on active
military duty simultaneously created an enormous hole in the American workforce and a
dramatic increase in demand for pornography. While women filled the vacant jobs, the wartime
popularity of “pinups” and pornography helped usher sexual images into mainstream culture.280
In response to the increased volume and acceptance of sexual images, as well as the showing of
female autonomy in the absence of men, the fiercest conservative movement of the Twentieth
century arose in the 1950’s.281 Women were encouraged to leave the workforce and return to the
home, so that men returning from war could once again fill the marketplace jobs. While nearly
half (47%) of women aged 18-24 were enrolled in higher education in 1920, that number
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dropped to just thirty percent by 1950.282 Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique discusses how
severely this conservatism stifled women:
In the fifteen years after World War II, the mystique of feminine fulfillment
became the cherished core of contemporary American culture. Millions of women
lived their lives in the image of pretty pictures of the American suburban
housewife, kissing their husbands goodbye in front of the picture window,
depositing their station-wagons full of children at school, and smiling as they ran
the new electric waxer over the spotless kitchen floor. Their only dream was to be
perfect wives and mothers. . . . The problem was a strange stirring, a sense of
dissatisfaction, a yearning that women suffered in the middle of the twentieth
century in the United States. Each suburban wife struggled with it alone. As she
made the beds, shopped for groceries, [and] . . . lay beside her husband at night—
she was afraid to ask even of herself the silent question—Is this all?
For over fifteen years there was no word of this yearning in the millions of
words written about women, for women, in all the columns, books and articles by
experts telling women their role was to seek fulfillment as wives and mothers.
Over and over women heard in voices of tradition and of Freudian sophistication
that they could desire no greater destiny than to glory in their own femininity.
They were taught to pity the neurotic, unfeminine, unhappy women who wanted
to be poets or physicists or presidents. They learned that truly feminine women do
not want careers, higher education, political rights. . . . All they had to do was
devote their lives from earliest girlhood to finding a husband and bearing children
[and] a thousand expert voices applauded their femininity, their adjustment, their
new maturity. 283
Along with this conservative movement came renewed anti-smut campaigns and tightened
obscenity laws.284 But the anti-pornography campaigns of the 1950’s met with greater resistance
than had similar campaigns at the turn of the century,285 and the Supreme Court in Roth affirmed
that societal attitudes regarding “proper” sexual conduct could not be turned all the way back to
Victorian mores.286 Whatever its flaws, Roth was the first time the Court had placed
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constitutional limits on the suppression of sexual expression. Yet, there is no doubt that this
development came only after a century of working to establish some sexual freedom for women.
Finally, the refusal to expand the scope of obscenity jurisprudence to speech other than
that about sex has constitutionalized the notion that sex—and in particular, female sexuality—is
unacceptable for public discourse. In practice, keeping sex taboo has mandated reliance on
normative sexual stereotypes to define obscenity, because the lack of public discourse precludes
basing “community standards” on the actual beliefs and practices of the community. Because
the prevailing sexual stereotypes consider overt female sexuality taboo, obscenity laws function
to stifle women’s sexual autonomy and perpetuate their subordination.
D. Gender Bias #3: Preventing Violence From Being Taboo
There are two reasons why the Supreme Court has expressly refused to limit violent
speech. First, holding that depictions or descriptions of extreme violence are offensive to the
point of obscene would contravene hegemonic masculinity. Masculinity is associated with
power and strength in America, and the Supreme Court, or perhaps certain of its individual
members, will not take action that it feels undermines its strength and power in the eyes of the
American public. Second, the Court has thus far only been able to recognize that speech which
leads to violence, as opposed to that which depicts violence, is harmful, because only the former
affects the men who have shaped First Amendment jurisprudence.287
According to hegemonic masculinity, men have a propensity for violence.288 In keeping
with the masculine stereotype, men should not find depictions or descriptions of violence
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offensive. Quite contrarily, violence is glorified in the realm of the masculine.289 As Angela
Harris writes, “[m]anliness is one of those ideas that is often made real with violence . . . men
use violence or the threat of violence as an affirmative way of proving individual or collective
masculinity, or in desperation when they perceive their masculine self-identity to be under
attack.”290 Indeed, the more violent a man appears, the more “manly” he is considered.291
Moreover, it is axiomatic that masculinity is often considered synonymous with strength
and power.292 This is the primary reason that the Supreme Court will not recognize violent
speech as obscene or otherwise outside of the First Amendment: because doing so would offend
the prevailing notion of masculinity and thus make the Court look less powerful. The Court’s
given reason for voiding as unconstitutionally vague the California and Congressional laws that
applied the inherent morality standard to violent speech was the absence of an historical
consensus on what depictions of violence cross the boundary between acceptable and offensive.
However, as evidenced by the fact that nearly all states have enacted or attempted some form of
legislation aimed at curbing violent expression,293 it is clear that there is some consensus that
America’s violent expressions have, as of late, “exceeded common limits of custom and
289
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candor.”294 Therefore, I submit that the current conservative bench would rather err on the side
of non-censorship than offend the dominant concept of American masculinity, lest such a move
undermine the Court’s public image. The Court’s stance is quite unfortunate, because, as David
S. Cohen points out, “when the law complies with [hegemonic] notions of how men and women
should behave, desire, and feel and allows institutions to build and construct those notions, the
law is furthering sex-role stereotyping of men and women. Furthermore, it perpetuates the
association of power—which has been traditionally masculine—with men[.]”295
The second way that the refusal to cabin violent expression can be seen as gender bias is
a common theme in feminist theory: that the masculine viewpoint is considered the objectively
neutral viewpoint renders the law an inherently masculine structure, redressing only the harms
felt by men.296 Catherine MacKinnon wrote that male dominance is “perhaps the most pervasive
and tenacious system of power in history . . . it is metaphysically nearly perfect. Its point of view
is the standard for point-of-viewlessness, its particularity the meaning of universality.”297 And
Richard Collier stated that “law is not simply equated with men's power. Law constitute[s]
men's power in its purest form. . . . The law sees and treats women the way men see and treat
women. Law's purported neutrality is simply a mask for the masculinity of its judgments.”298
To illustrate this point, I pose the question: Why are fighting words proscribable while
speech about violence that does not lead to immediate physical violence is not? Because in the
former, men feel their attendant harms. That is, when men get so offended by a speaker’s words
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that they would punch him, those offensive words are wholly without First Amendment
protection and may be banned at law. However, since hegemonic femininity instructs that
women are socially forbidden from reacting to verbal assault with physical aggression, the
fighting words doctrine does not offer women protection from verbal assault as it does men.
Conversely, the law does not even recognize, let alone punish, offensive speech that is directed at
women in the public sphere. Street harassment is an epidemic the world over, causing women to
fear assault on their moral character as well as physical person as they walk in their own
neighborhoods. But because street harassment is a harm men do not feel, women are told to
“simply avert their eyes.”
The Court ignores vast amounts of empirical data showing at least a correlative
connection, if not causal connection, between realistic depictions of violence and violent acts.
The Court’s willful blindness seems particularly imprudent in the face of an alarming rise in
school shootings by teenaged boys who play endless hours of extremely violent video games.
Further, that the Court is willing to disregard that new technologies seriously increase the
ubiquity, interactivity, effectiveness, and impressionability of violent images on viewers solely to
protect its appearance of power (and by extension, masculinity) is troubling.

IV.

CONCLUSION
In sum, the disparate treatment of sex and violence under current obscenity jurisprudence

can be seen as a manifestation of gender bias in several ways. Relying on community standards
to define what material is offensive to the point of obscene necessarily incorporates insidious
gender stereotypes regarding “proper” sexual conduct. These stereotypes hold that traits of
sexuality and violence are the exclusive province of men. By limiting the scope of obscenity to
the topic of sex, the Supreme Court constitutionalizes the notion that sexuality—female sexuality
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especially—is too immoral and offensive a topic for public discourse. The refusal to regulate
speech on the topic of violence according to the same standard when the same harms are present
furthers the normative masculine stereotype that glorifies violence. When the law complies with
hegemonic notions of how men and women should behave, it is inappropriately furthering sexual
stereotypes, which function to suppress the sexuality of the men and women whose preferences
may diverge from the governing norms. Legal codification of sexual stereotypes is something
the law should seek to eradicate, not perpetuate.
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